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In this paper we discuss the European regulation policy regarding vertical separation in 
communications  and  electricity  industries.  In  the  electricity  sector  the  discussion 
concerns ownership unbundling while in communications the regulatory debate is about 
functional separation. We conclude that for electricity, ownership unbundling seems to 
be the best option to achieve competition in wholesale markets although there is still 
some risks concerning investment. Instead, for the communication sector the regulatory 
options are deeply dependent on the intensity of network competition between operators 
1that combine different technological platforms.  Technology  also seems to be a key 
driver for diverse regulatory approaches concerning the unbundling requirement. 
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1.  Introduction 
  During the last 25 years, both on developed and developing countries, there has 
been a sound experience of restructuring, deregulation and privatization of sectors that 
were previously regulated monopolies and most of the times also state-owned. Reasons 
behind this trend were manifold: technology changes, poor performance of regulated 
firms and a general ideological shift towards markets are among the most important.  
A central feature in debate for network sectors concerns unbundling.The most common 
argument  in  favor  of  integration  was  basically  twofold:  it  would  be  a  solution  to 
overcome,  at  least  partially,  double  marginalization  and  it  would  give  incentives  to 
upstream  investments  (Hoeffler  and  Kranz,  2008).  Since  the  90’s  and  for  most 
European network industries, the main political question - Should vertical integration be 
allowed? – has been replaced by two others:  
·  How far that separation should go? 
·  Should the same policy principles apply to all network industries, namely public 
utilities?   
In the communications sector most of the European countries already implemented 
accounting  separation  and  the  present  debate  is  about  functional  separation.  UK 
introduced it in 2006. Sweden and Italy followed this policy aiming to encourage retail 
competition. However, other European countries (Netherlands, for instance) regulators 
decided to maintain vertical integration, mainly arguing that the incumbent firms face 
competition from alternative networks. 
Based  upon  the  evidence  of  unbalanced  cost  allocation  by  electricity  firms 
between regulated and non-regulated operations, the European Commission introduced 
the 96/92 EC Directive which required the accounting unbundling of both generation 
and retail stages of the electricity value chain from the network business (transmission 
and  distribution).  Later  on,  the  2003/54/CE  Directive  went  further  requiring  legal 
unbundling  as  there  were  serious  grid  access  problems  by  non-integrated  firms. 
Through their transmission business, integrated companies acted as barriers to market 
competition either favouring their own generators or through under investments on the 
transmission grid. Finally, in 2007, the Third Energy Package was proposed by EC in 
order to solve, among others, this problem which EU Energy Sector Enquiries proved to 
be major barriers to liberalisation. As it will be explained in section 4, the final outcome   3
of this recent EC regulatory initiative was a compromise that can eventually give place 
to under investment on the grids.  
  Therefore,  at  the  moment,  communications  and  electricity  face  the  same 
question: how far should the unbundling process go?  
  The  main  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  analyse  the  arguments  under  discussion, 
namely: 
1. Which were the main reasons for different regulatory approaches in the past? 
2. Presently is it possible to draw some lessons from one sector to the other 
concerning  the  effects  of  different  regulatory  approaches  on  competition  and 
investment? 
  Overall,  we  conclude  that  ownership  separation  is  fairly  influenced  by  the 
economic nature of each utility infrastructure. Vickers (1995) recognizes that the most 
significant contribution of ownership unbundling to competition in network industries is 
that it reduces the incentive to discrimination by a network operator which belongs to 
the  same  holding  group  of  other  generators  and/or  retail  firms.  There  is  empirical 
evidence on the increasing congestion of transmission networks with the development 
of wholesale markets and its negative impact on competition (Joskow, 2005a, 2005b 
and 2006). Also Hirst (2004) refers that the dynamics of investment in transmission 
capacity  is  far  from  that  of  trading  patterns.    Ownership  unbundling  achieves 
competition  in  electricity  wholesale  markets,  although  it  may  eventually  lead  to  a 
concentration increase of generation through mergers. In communications the regulatory 
policy regarding functional separation depends on the intensity of network competition 
between operators that combine different technological platforms.  
  The structure of the paper is the following: in section 2 we present a theoretical 
framework for the comparison of the unbundling problem in both sectors. In section 3 
we discuss the vertical separation in the communication sector, focusing in the recent 
European experiences and on the challenges from the developments of next generation 
networks. In section 4 we discuss the recent regulatory developments in the electricity 
sector highlighting the arguments in favour and against ownership unbundling and in 
section 5 we present our main conclusions.   4
 
2.  A theoretical framework 
Network industries (telecom, electricity, gas, railways, aviation, postal services, etc) 
have  unique  characteristics:  significant  economies  of  scale  or  scope  (extending  to 
natural monopolies); far-reaching externalities in production or consumption; and large 
vertical and horizontal integration. According to Joskow and Scmalensee (1983) and 
Baumol and Sidak (1994), these features explain why the introduction of competitive 
mechanisms and the creation of open markets had equal impacts on both innovations 
and disruptions.  
Telecommunications  and  electricity  have  separate  activities  which  produce 
intermediate goods or services that are complements in the production of a final good or 
service. This means that there is a vertical relationship. Furthermore, these industries 
often present significant economies of scale which, due to efficiency arguments, have 
justified being regulated and fully integrated. Network externalities were also common 
arguments used to justify that communications industries could not sustain competition  
with  vertical  separation.  Like  other  utility  industries,  these  utilities  have  separate 
activities which produce intermediate goods or services that are complements in the 
production  of  a  final  good  or  service.  This  means  that  there  are  strong  vertical 
relationships. Furthermore, they often present significant scale and scope economies 
which, due to efficiency arguments, have justified being regulated and fully integrated. 
Additionally, the need to ensure adequate incentives to invest in the networks upgrades, 
through  the  expected  returns  on  investments  is  a  crucial  argument  in  the  vertical 
integration  decisions  of  firms  and  regulators.    Vertical  integration  requires  strong 
regulation  in  order  to  avoid  the  anti-competitive  behaviour,  which  might  negatively 
affected  the  incentive  to  invest,  both  from  incumbents  and  new  operators.  When 
incumbent firms anticipate the regulatory obligation to share the network with rivals at 
regulated prices that do not allow the expected return of the investment their incentive 
to invest is threat. Also, the investment from new firms might be negatively affected as 
the firms expect to use the incumbent network and so have a little incentive to build 
their own infrastructure.  Vertical integration also has strong limitations concerning the 
transparency on the allocation of common costs. Allocation of common costs can be use 
with  anticompetitive  purposes.  Network  externalities  were  also  common  arguments   5
used  to  justify  that  communications  industries  could  not  sustain  competition  with 
vertical separation.  
However, many arguments in favor of some degree of vertical separation have been 
advanced in all the three industries under analysis. The standard arguments rely on the 
anticompetitive practices implemented by the vertically integrated firms, in particular 
when  there  are  blocked  segments,  that  is,  when  the  independent  operators  have  no 
alternatives to the vertical integrate network access in order to develop their activities. 
Other  important  argument  is  related  with  the  reduction  of  regulatory  intervention 
allowed by the development of competition  
The  discussion  presented  in  the  following  sections  is  made  along  the  above 
arguments concerning unbundling and also concerning the different degrees of vertical 
separation  that  regulatory  authorities  and  operators  have  been  discussing  and 
implementing at quite different speeds in the three sectors under analysis. At a general 
framework it is convenient to distinguished ownership, legal, functional and accounting 
separation.
2 Ownership separation requires the separation of network infrastructure from 
the services that use the infrastructure, by the creation of legal separate firms with a 
different  ownership.  The  ownership  separation  might  be  incomplete,  when  there  is 
partial ownership. Ownership separation is the higher degree of vertical separation that 
also  implies  the  higher  costs  from  loosing  vertical  integration.  Legal  separation  is 
comparable to ownership separation, in the sense that it requires the existence of legal 
separate entities, but these entities have common ownership. 
Functional  separation  requires  the  creation  of  an  independent  division  that  is 
responsible for the parts of the networks not easily replicate and provides access in an 
equal basis to the retail operators, including the incumbent retail operator. This business 
unit has an independent management from the rest of the firm. Functional separation is 
an intermediate form of vertical separation as the separate business units have common 
ownership.  Implementing  functional  separation  requires  the  existence  of  separate 
information systems and the training of  employees in order to respect the “Chinese 
walls” built between the business units, so that non-discrimination of independent firms 
is achieved. 
Accounting separation is the weaker form of vertical separation as the upstream and 
downstream activities take place in the same firm. Only the accounts of each activity are 
                                                           
2 For a more detailed description of different degrees of vertical separation see Cave (2006). For deeper 
developments of function separation see, for instance, Tropina et al. (2010).   6
separate. Accounting separation allows transparency  about internal transfer prices in 
order to avoid price discrimination. However, this level of separation does not ensure 
non-price discrimination, such as delays or different product quality. 
  One  shall  bear  in  mind  that,  although  crucial  for  the  reform  process,  the 
separation  of  potentially  competitive  activities  from  network  activities  is  just  one 
dimension of the building of competitive markets. According to Glachant and Perez 
(2007) the other two dimensions are also very important:  modularity and sequencing. 
Baldwin & Clark (2000) define the former as “(…) a particular design structure, in 
which parameters and tasks are interdependent within modules and independent across 
them” but they clearly state that “but in a complex design, there are often many levels of 
visible and hidden information”, which means that perfect modularity is far from being the 
most common case. 
The third dimension is the implementation of those modules into the chain to 
carry the competitive transactions in the new framework. As some authors emphasize, 
the decisions sequence in the construction of competitive modular chains is critical and 
nearly as important as the actual structure of those chains. According to Newbery (2002), 
this sequence structures the behavior of the stakeholders as it creates new interests and new 
rights over both the modules and the transactions between them. To Aoki (2001), each 
institution can generate incentives and manages information autonomously. This may be a 
handicap as it can be difficult to economic agents to understand and to use a complex 
institution. But this author also calls the attention for the impact that the overlap of existing 
institutions can have on the evolution and the combination of their activities. 
In short, unbundling is one aspect of the complex competitive reform of network 
industries,  although  it  may  be  actually  the  most  important  in  the  present  stage  of  the 
European liberalization process. 
In  the  following  sections  it  is  presented  the  discussion  of  the  regulatory  options 
concerning  the  various  degrees  of  vertical  separation  recently  applied  in  the 
telecommunications, electricity and natural gas industries. 
 
3.  The Communications Sector 
3.1. Vertical Separation: the European experience 
  Traditionally  network  access  was  the  main  instrument  used  by  European 
regulators to promote efficient entry and competition. Vertical separation, although in 
discussion,  had  limited  practical  implementation.  The  reasons  for  this  trend  can  be   7
found  in  several  features  of  the  communications  sector  when  compared  with  other 
network sectors, like electricity, natural gas or railways, which continue to be natural 
monopolies. This does not happen entirely in the communications network, as many 
segments  the  infrastructure  monopoly  is  contested  by  competing  infrastructures, 
essentially due to technological developments.  
  Additionally,  there  are  important  cost  complementarities  and  economies  of 
scope between network and services. The introduction of new products or the upgrade 
of the existing ones frequently requires adjustments in the network, and this might be 
costly  under  vertical  separation  (Olsen  et  al.,  2008).  These  arguments  contribute  to 
explain why the European incumbent firms’, were privatized a single integrated firm. 
  However, it is crucial to point out that vertical integration has negative effects on 
competition,  essentially  because  firms  have  incentives  to  discriminate  against 
competitors.
3 The discrimination can be based on prices or on other strategies, including 
raising  the  rivals’  costs,  reducing  the  quality  of  the  input  delivered  to  downstream 
competitors or reducing rivals’ demand.
4 
  Additionally,  vertical  separation  may  allow  a  reduction  on  the  regulatory 
intervention, as anticompetitive behavior is much less likely to occur
5 and this effect is 
more intense as deeper is the vertical separation. 
  Recently  the  European  debate  about  vertical  separation  was  intensified  and 
accompanied by some implementation. Certainly, this trend is not independent on the 
observation that, in several markets, the access regulation was not able to develop real 
competition in the downstream segments (Bijl, 2005). Olsen et al. (2008) referred that, 
in the Danish market for ADSL-services, it is even difficult to ensure equal treatment of 
all operators through regulation. Also, in Italy, there was a slow implementation of LLU 
until 2006 (Baake, 2006). For the UK, Whalley and Curwen (2008) argue that “Service 
based  competition  had  been  possible  since  the  late  1990s  but  had  enjoyed  limited 
success because, it was alleged, BT had abused its dominant position”. 
  In order to analyze the development of retail competition we present information 
about the fixed broadband access market (Tables 1 and 2). Four different types of access 
are referred: (i) Resale (the entrant firm resells the services provide by the incumbent, 
                                                           
3 To a deeper discussion of this argument see Cave (2008), Doyle (2008) and the references therein. 
4 These strategies are often called sabotage. For details see Mandy and Sappington (2007). 
5 For a detailed description of the merits and disadvantages of functional and structural separation see Bijl 
(2005), OCDE (2003, 2007) and Cave and Doyle (2007). For an analytical approach see Sappington 
(2006), Doyle (2008), Kirsh and Hirschhausen (2008) and Gomez-Ibanez (2003).   8
without introducing specific features); (ii) Bitstream access (the incumbent installs a 
high speed access to the final consumer and the entrant uses this access, having some 
freedom in the definition of its services); (iii) Share access (incumbent and entrant use 
the  same  line,  the  incumbent  continues  to  deliver  telephone  service  and  the  entrant 
provides high speed data services); (iv) Full local loop unbundling (the incumbent rents 
a  line  that  is  exclusively  used  by  the  entrant,  which  allows  more  freedom  in  the 
specification of its services). Therefore, resale is the simplest type of entry and the one 
that requires less investment from the entrants. Additionally, it is the type of entry that 
weakly contributes for the development of a competitive retail market. On the other 
extreme full local looping unbundling is the type of unbundling that strongly contributes 
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    Source: EC (2008a)   9
 
  In  the  period  2005-2008,  and  for  most  of  the  countries,  new  entrants  had 
globally  gained market  share.  In Slovenia, Germany  and Portugal the new entrants’ 
DSL lines increased 30.7, 22.5 and 24.8 percentage points. The significant exceptions 
are Malta, Belgium and Netherlands, with decreases of 37.4; 14.7 and 8.4 percentage 
points, respectively.  
  There was also a reduction in resale and a pronounced increased in the types of 
access  that  allow  the  development  of  differentiate  strategies  for  the  entrants  (in 
particular  Full  ULL).  Malta  and  UK  are  two  cases  of  a  strong  reduction  in  the 
proportion of resale (56.8 and 29.6 percentage points, respectively). Portugal, France 
and Greece are the countries with higher increases of Full ULL (25.3; 23.6 and 20.3 
percentage points, respectively). 
  Overall, this information suggests that in this period there was an increase in the 
competitive level of the retail broadband markets. However, it also clearly displays the 
heterogeneity in the entry process in the broadband access market among the European 
countries. 
  In Europe the debate on vertical separation came to the front of discussion with 
the  implementation  of  functional  separation  of  British  Telecom  in  2006.  In  2005, 
Ofcom studied the vertical separation of  British Telecom in two  companies, one of 
which would supply retail services while the other would supply the wholesale services 
to all suppliers of retail services. However, in 2006, and with the agreement of BT, 
Ofcom decided for functional separation, which does not involve the creation of a legal 
independent  firm.  Functional  separation  implies  the  separation  of  the  parts  of  the 
network that are difficult to replicate but that are necessary to provide final services 
(ERG, 2007). The decision leaded to the creation of Openreach, a division operationally 
independent from BT. Openreach is in charge of the management of the incumbent’s 
network  and  also  of  the  provision  of  access  to  the  network,  not  only  to  the  retail 
departments of BT but to independent operators as well. Accordingly to Ofcom this 
arrangement  is  more  effective  in  securing  non  discriminatory  practices  and  in 
encouraging investment in network than the access price regulation.
6 The evaluation 
made by Ofcom of the functional separation is globally positive.
7 This is supported by 
the significant increase in the unbundled lines in UK: the sum of Full ULL with Share 
                                                           
6 This opinion is also shared by Reding (2007). 
7 For a detailed analysis and reference of the Ofcom evaluation reports see Whalley and Curwen (2008).   10
access  lines  increased  from  73  140  in  2005  to  4.76  millions  in  2008  (EC,  2008a). 
Notwithstanding,  Ofcom  systematically  mentions  several  features  that  need  to  be 
improved. One is the separation of the information systems between Openreach and the 
rest  of  BT.  Without  this  separation  that  requires  the  effectiveness  of  the  “Chinese 
walls”, is quite difficult to avoid the non-discriminatory behaviour of BT.  
  Meanwhile,  in  2007,  the  EC  considered  functional  separation  as  a  remedy 
available to the National Regulatory Authorities, along with traditional remedies. 
  Several other European regulators and incumbent firms are studying functional 
separation. In 2008, Telecom Italia announced the creation of Open Access, a division 
inspired in the UK Openreach (Whalley and Curwen, 2008).
8 In Denmark there are also 
some proposals to follow the UK example (Olsen et al., 2008). In 2007, the Netherlands 
regulator decided not to implement vertical separation. The main arguments relay on the 
existence of an alternative infrastructure (cable), and on the potential negative effects on 
investment in NGN (Whalley and Curven, 2008). On the contrary, in 2008, TeliaSonera 
agree with the Swedish regulator the implementation of functional separation. 
  Overall, we conclude that in recent years there is a great diversity of strategies 
among  the  European  countries  concerning  vertical  integration.  As  one  important 
argument is based on the development of alternative infrastructures, we present in detail 















































































































































































































    Source: EC (2008a). 
                                                           
8 According to Amendola et al. (2007), operational separation was introduced in Italy in 2002, and its 
positive effects in terms of increasing of LLU lines and decline in wholesale prices were already visible in 
2005. The operational separation is a lighter form of vertical separation than functional separation. For a 














































































































































































































    Source: EC (2008a). 
 
  It  stands  out  that  DSL  continues  to  be  the  dominant  infrastructure  in  the 
broadband access in several countries. In France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Cyprus, 
the  DSL  has  a  market  share  above  90%.  Then,  it  is  difficult  to  consider  that  the 
competitive pressure of the alternative platforms is a strong argument in favor of the 
vertical integration. On the contrary, in Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, DSL has a 
market share below 61%.
9 
  Also, Member States where DSL is the dominant platform are among those that 
have more broadband lines: Germany has 20.1% of all broadband fixed lines of the 27 
European countries, UK and France has 15.5% and 15.4%, followed by Italy, Spain and 
Netherlands (EC, 2008).
10 
   
3.2. The effects of vertical separation on investment 
  In  spite  of  the  positive  effects,  vertical  separation  also  has  some  drawbacks. 
Besides the structural effects not easily reverted, two other negative effects must be 
discussed: 
i) Vertical separation might increase the costs of coordination and sacrifice economies 
of scope; 
ii) Vertical separation might reduce the incentives to invest and to innovate. 
 
                                                           
9 Notice that in several countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic or Romania) the market share of DSL is low 
but the absolute values for broadband lines in these countries are also (see Table I in Appendix). 
10 See Table I in Appendix.   12
  The introduction of new services frequently requires adjustments in the network 
and this might be costly to implement under vertical separation (Olsen et al., 2008). One 
example of this problem is found in the complaints of UK independent operators about 
the interaction with BT after the creation of Openreach. Furthermore, Amendola et al. 
(2007) argue that for higher types of vertical separation (as is the case of functional 
separation relative to operational separation) the negative effects are more pronounced 
due  to  an  increase  in  cost  transactions  and  to  the  lower  incentives  to  invest  and 
innovate.  
  Vertical separation can reduce the incentive to invest and innovate as: 
i)  the  easier  access  to  the  incumbent’s  network  discourages  the  investment  by 
independent operators in their own networks, and then the “ladder of investment”
11 is 
interrupted.  Therefore,  the  regulatory  goal  of  developed  infrastructure  competition 
might be weakened. The empirical observations of Crandall and Sidack (2002) for the 
USA  markets  support  this  argument.  Furthermore,  the  vertical  separation  might 
intensify the dependence of the alternative operators from the incumbent’s network. 
ii) may cause a delay in the decisions to invest in particular when the coordination 
between network investments and services specifications is crucial. Amendola et al. 
(2007) relate the delay in UK investments in NGN with the functional separation of BT, 
arguing that the countries where functional separation was not  adopted are also the 
countries with more investment in NGN. 
iii) may reinforce the market power at the wholesale level with negative consequences 
for  the  development  of  infrastructure  network  competition  and,  thus,  with  negative 
effects on investment and innovation at this level. 
 
3.3. Next generation networks (NGN) 
  With the development of NGN, the same network can deliver to final consumers 
different services (voice, data, video, high definition television, etc). Then, there is room 
for  significant  economies  of  scale  and  scope  (Doyle,  2008;  ERG,  2007).  This 
perspective supports the argument of the incumbent firms that wish to maintain and 
develop vertically integrated networks. In this context, old concerns about the exercise 
of  market  power  the  network  rise  out  again.  “Leveraging  market  power  in 
                                                           
11 The “ladder of investment” theory (Cave and Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006) foresees that initially the 
entrant  firms  use  the  incumbent  firm’s  network  to  deliver  their  products  and  this  allows  retail 
competition. After the initial period, new entrants will invest in their own infrastructure competing with 
the incumbent firm also at the upstream segments of the market.   13
telecommunications  is  a  live  and  real  issue  and  is  becoming  more  pertinent  in  the 
context of NGN and NGA investments” (Doyle, 2008). 
  The  communications  sector  is  at  this  moment  in  a  crucial  period.  Huge 
investments in fibre optical network are vital for the development of the NGN. And the 
incumbent  firms  are  large  investors.  Functional  separation,  designed  to  solve  more 
efficiently  the  problem  of  discrimination  of  the  independent  operators  may  have 
negative effects on the incentives to invest. As was mentioned above, OPTA decided 
not to implement functional separation because of the potential negative effects on the 
incentive to invest in NGN. 
  Additionally,  the  technical  changes  introduced  by  NGNs  might  have 
consequences on the decision of vertical separation. Until recently “telecommunication 
services were delivered on dedicated networks: telephony on PSTN, data services on 
data networks, television on cable networks.” (Olsen et al., 2008), and access price 
regulation  intended  to  incentive  downstream  competition.  However,  this  is  rapidly 
changing  with  the  development  of  NGN  and  it  is  foreseeable  the  development  of 
competitive networks. A re-evaluation of the arguments in favor and against vertical 
separation in communication sector is necessary in this new framework. For instance, 
Kirsch and Hirschhausen (2008) argue that, from a technological point of view, as NGN 
allow the provision of several services thought the combination of different physical 
network infrastructure, there will be  a separation of infrastructure  and  services and, 
consequently,  a  reduction  in  the  economies  of  scope  between  infrastructure  and 
services.  Then,  the  authors  claim  that  “structural  separation  becomes  less  costly  as 
technical synergy losses from the separation of access networks are mitigated” (Kirsch 
and Hirschhausen, 2008. p.71). 
  Therefore, firms can offer to final consumers bundles of services (triple play, for 
instance)  that  are  provided  through  the  combination  of  different  technological 
platforms. Competition between vertically integrated firms that in the past had a single 
dominant technology may be reinforced.  
 
4. The Electric Power Industry 
 
  The  physical  characteristics  of  the  electricity  supply  industry  are  the  main 
determinants of its optimal regulatory design. The industry has large sunk costs, its 
value  chain  is  composed  by  four  vertical  stages  with  different  optimal  scales   14
(generation, transmission, distribution and retailing) and it is a single product industry 
of a non-storable good delivered through a network, requiring instantaneous supply and 
demand physical balance. 
 
4.1  When Physics meets Economics 
 
  Balancing  generation  and consumption is one of the most complex technical 
problems to be solved. It arises from the electricity market specific features: the need 
for  continuous  electrical  equilibrium,  unexpected  demand  and  supply  fluctuations,  a 
limited  capacity  to  establish  and  send  price  signals  to  market  participants  on  a 
continuous basis and also a small short-run elasticity of demand (Fehr et al., 2005). 
  A real-time balance between generation and electricity consumption (both by 
end users and the grid itself) is crucial for safeguarding transmission system security. 
As electricity is not storable, disturbances of equilibrium between generation and load 
make the system frequency to deviate from its set value which, according to the extent 
of  that  deviation,  can  affect  the  behavior  of  electrical  equipment  or  lead  to  the 
(protective)  disconnection  of  generation  plants.  Large  deviations  may  even  cause 
system black-outs.   
Different  types  of  transmission  institutional  arrangements  may  cover  either 
partially  or  completely  the  European  power  system.  Almost  all  continental  systems 
(managed  by  different  transmission  organizations  under  different  regulations)  are 
interconnected and synchronized (every system has the same frequency all the time). 
These  interconnected  systems  create  strong  externalities  between  zones  (e.g.  loop 
flows
12). This is not the case for the UK power system. It is an “isolated” system, thus it 
is not synchronized with the continental system (it is interconnected by DC lines
13). In 
this case, externalities are much smaller than in continental Europe as there are no loop 
flows. Thus, the coordination of the whole European power system is not an easy task 
but it is an absolute condition, as to increase cross-border competition as well as the 
internalization of cross-border externalities (Thomas, 2007). 
                                                           
12 Loop flow: The movement of electric power from generator to load by dividing along multiple parallel 
paths; it especially refers to power flow along an unintended path that loops away from the most direct 
geographic path or contract path (EIA Energy Glossary). 
13 Direct current (DC) is the unidirectional flow of electric charge. Direct current is produced by such 
sources as batteries, thermocouples, solar cells, and commutator-type electric machines of the dynamo 
type. Direct current may flow in a conductor such as a wire, but can also be through semiconductors, 
insulators, or even through a vacuum as in electron or ion beams. In direct current, the electric charges 
flow in a constant direction, distinguishing it from alternating current (AC).   15
  The importance of transmission, a natural monopoly that has to be regulated, is 
not proportional to its share on the total cost of supplied electricity: about 5% according 
to some authors always under 10% according to others
14. Retailers and generating firms 
(particularly those with large power plants) have the greatest interest on transmission 
network.
15 Both for generation and retailing, competitive markets suppose access to the 
network  on  equal,  non-discriminatory  conditions.  This  is  the  main  reason  why 
unbundling is necessary. However, how far this should go remains controversial. 
There  is  sound  empirical  evidence  of  the  benefits  and  cost  savings  from  vertical 
integration (see, for example, Kaserman and Mayo, 1991; Fraquelli, G. et all.2005). 
Advantages  are  manifold.  We  can  distinguish,  both  for  electricity  and  natural  gas, 
among others: the reduction of transportation costs if common ownership results in closer 
geographic proximity as well as the  reduction of coordination costs; control over inputs – 
generation for electricity and production or imports for gas - is increased which allows for 
differentiation in favor of related businesses; entry barriers are increased and may be used by 
integrated  incumbents  against  potential  competitors;  finally,  the  integrated  utility  is  able  to 
capture profit margins either upstream and downstream. 
 
4.2 From full integration to vertical separation  
 
The reform of the European electricity industry started in Great Britain in 1989 through 
a massive privatization and restructuring program. 
 The basic assumption for the reform was that competition would force power firms to become 
more efficient, engaging lower prices and better services.  
Electricity  competitive  reforms  comprehend  four  inter-related  steps: 
privatization of state-owned assets; opening the market to competition; the unbundling 
of transmission and distribution from generation and retailing; the introduction of an 
independent regulator. However, the EU liberalization process only concerned directly 
the  three  last  steps.  The  EU  Directives  have  never  mentioned  privatization  as  a 
necessary condition to accomplish the competitive reforms. Nevertheless, the empirical 
evidence made it clear that liberalization could not be pursued without privatization of 
former state owned monopolies (Pollitt, 2009). 
                                                           
14 See, for example, Thomas (2007) and Marques (2003). 
15  Households  and  industrial  customers  (except  a  very  small  part  of  the  largest  consumers  that  are 
supplied directly by the transmission network) are connected to the (low voltage) distribution network. 
Small generators and most renewable and combined heat and power (CHP) generators feed directly into 
the distribution network.   16
All EU countries have been required to unbundle and liberalise their wholesale 
and retail markets since 1998. However, the consequences on competition and on prices 
are  still  far  from  what  was  expected  from  the  implementation  of  EC  Directives.  
According to Hall et al (2009) ownership concentration remains a core feature of the 
European electricity market despite the competitive reform. 
Electricity systems were highly integrated worldwide, most of the times fully integrated, until 
the 90’s. As for gas utilities, this meant that the different stages of the electricity (and gas) value 
chain remained in the same firm, most of the times state-owned. The electric power industrial 
organization  presented  a  similar  organization  worldwide:  highly  controlled  monopolies  in 
exclusive (franchise) areas.   
The  traditional  model  presented  four  main  characteristics:  vertical  integration,  state 
ownership, monopoly and a whole, final tariff that consumers must pay without any chance to 
choose their supplier. 
 
Figure 1 –Value Chain of the Electric Power Industry: the traditional model 
 
 
The electricity value chain has four stages: generation from a variety of sources; 
transmission  which  is  the  transport  of  high  voltage  electricity  over  long  distances;  
distribution  as the local transportation at lower voltage to final customers; and at last, 
the retailing activities which comprehend the selling and billing to final consumers..  
A high vertical integration between the four stages of the value chain was quite 
frequent, although other cases concerned only the integration between generation and 
transmission or between distribution and retail. Another important feature of electricity 
companies  was  –  still  is  in  several  cases  –  their  large  size  and  importance  within 
national frontiers. The economic arguments for the traditional model are the significant 
vertical economies which could be obtained. Those economies are particularly evident 
between generation and transmission.  Meanwhile, there are also significant economies 
of density in distribution, especially to smaller customers. But there are three kinds of 
economic incentives for vertical integration that are generally presented: the reduction 
of  transactions  costs  but  also  distortions  arising  from  market  power  of  upstream 
activities  or/and  downstream  activities  and  information  improvement  (OECD, 
2001).The argument used for market power distortions remains particularly interesting   17
due  to  its  assumptions.  Starting  from  the  fact  that,  whenever  a  price  differs  from 
marginal  cost,  there  is  a  loss  in  overall  welfare,  the  argument  in  favor  of  vertical 
integration was that it would ensure that the firm would sell to its downstream partner at 
a price equal to marginal cost.  
Since the 19(90)’s the EU energy policy has introduced  deep and extensive 
changes on electricity and natural gas  markets that  have completely modify the old 
energy paradigm. Three Electricity Directives have been set: 1996, 2003 and 2009. As 
Politt (2009) refers, these Directives also had a significant impact on the energy policy 
of two European non-EU countries: Norway and Switzerland.  
The Directives general model for electricity and also gas considered the four 
separate activities mentioned above where electricity generation or gas production or 
import is known as wholesale activity. The rationale behind the Directives was clear: 
wholesale and retail activities could be made competitive, thus the prices would be set 
by markets as the core assumption was that sectors which are run on competitive rules 
are more efficient than those run as monopolies. The final result should be lower prices 
to  the  final  consumers.  Transmission  and  distribution  were  natural  monopolies  and 
prices would be set by an independent Regulator. 
The liberalization process has been a dynamic, huge task, since it has involved 
various  problems:  the  enlargement  of  national  to  regional  markets,  the  reduction  of 
entry barriers to new competitors on generation and retail, the reforming of transmission 
and  distribution  regulation  emphasizing  investment  incentives  and  considering 
scattered, intermittent renewable generation. Independent regulation also proved to be 
critical for the achievement of the reforms.   The three Electricity Directives can be seen 
not just as the legislative background of the liberalization process but also as a process 
of  learning  by  doing  and  learning  by  other  experiences  around  the  world. 
Notwithstanding the broader scope of the EU Directives, the unbundling issue stands as 
the core of the controversy about the best strategy to break down persistent barriers to 
cross-border trade, investment and competition (Buchan, 2007).  
The unbundling process dates from the 96/92/CE Directive which introduced the 
independence of Transmission Operators (TSO) and Distribution Operators (DSO) from 
generation and trade. For TSOs this separation should be, at least on management, and 
for DSOs the independence should be on accountability.    
According to Thomas (2007) the distinction between the network ownership and 
the  network  operation  was  already  implicit.  In  fact,  the  Directive  imposed  that  the   18
access to the networks should be available to all wholesalers and retailers on equal 
terms.  Moreover,  an  independent  regulatory  board  was  supposed  to  ensure  that  this 
access should be impartial and in the competitive stages of the value chain (wholesale 
and retail businesses) that competition should be fair. Thus, the crucial question should 
be who controls the network –respectively, the TSO and the DSO – not the network 
owners. However, the empirical evidence proved that the 1
st Directive was unable to 
attain its main goals. 
  However, under accounting unbundling, integrated utilities could still allocate 
costs to the advantage of the firm. As there were common costs shared by generation 
and  transmission,  the  opportunity  to  have  a  substantial  share  of  those  costs 
inappropriately allocated to the network business was real.  The final outcome was the 
unjustified increase of scale economies. 
The 2003/54/CE Directive went further. Transmission and Distribution should 
be, at least, legally unbundled. Thus, for both segments of the value chain, management 
should be legally independent from generation and supply. Once again, the rationale 
behind the 2
nd Directive was the concern about non-discriminatory access to electricity 
(and gas) networks but also a reasonable doubt on whether current arrangements were 
delivering efficient and timely investments in transmission capacity.  
  Legal unbundling is a better form of unbundling,  as it requires that the  grid 
should  be  owned  and  operated  by  a  firm  whose  exclusive  activity  is  the  network 
business. Although the cost allocation issue might be solved, other problems may arise 
due to the fact that the network can be owned by a firm which may belong to the same 
holding  group.  The  2
nd  Directive  confirmed  the  new  electricity  organization  model 
(Figure  2)  where:  generation  and  trading  businesses  are  competitive,  there  is  full 
incompatibility between monopolist and competitive activities and there is vertical and 
horizontal separation. 
Figure 2 – The New Electricity Model 
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The enquiries carried out by the European Commission in 2005 and 2006
16 concluded 
for  the  existence  of  severe  problems  concerning  the  effective  liberalization  of  the 
European energy market, namely: insufficient market integration, lack of transparency, 
lack of confidence on price determination, market concentration and small downstream 
market competition.
17 
  Market  integration  is  a  fundamental  tool  to  improve  competition  in  national 
markets.  Although  great  improvements  had  been  made  -  real  capacity  margin  have 
improved from less than 5% in 2005 to 7.6% in 2006 - there was still a large work to be 
done to  get a fully integrated market. Most of  the European countries  presented  an 
interconnection capacity (in relation to installed generation capacity) between 10% and 
30%.  Both the lack of transparency and the lack of confidence on prices determination 
may be translated, among others, by the diversity of prices and the consumer perception 
on change of electricity prices.
18 
  While there were prices that could be easily explained, there was also evidence 
of large discrepancies which were less understandable. Different kinds of fuels used in 
generation can be responsible for both high prices and high price volatility. Weather 
conditions  are  another  cause  of  high  prices,  for  they  can  explain  more  pressure  on 
demand and, in the case of small rain, the reliance of electricity generation on thermal 
plants. However, the diversity of tax share on final prices was also remarkably wide. 
Moreover, as EC studies on impact assessment recognized (EC, 2007d) from 1998 to 
2006,  in  countries  with  ownership  unbundling,  household  electricity  prices  rose  by 
5.9%, while the increase in countries without ownership unbundling attained 29.5%.
19  
  Despite the bias introduced by the  existence of regulated industrial tariffs in 
some countries, there was an evident dispersion of prices for the same type of customer. 
Tax share on final prices also presented (still presents) significant differences among 
member  states.  In  ownership  unbundled  markets
20  the  electricity  price  for  industrial 
consumers decreased by 3.0% along the same period of time, while in markets without 
ownership unbundling this price increased by 6.0% (EC, 2007d). 
                                                           
16  See EC (2005, 2006, 2007a and 2007b). 
17 For a detailed analysis see EC (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007b, 2007c, 2008b). 
18 See Tables 1A, 1B and 2 in Appendix. 
19  The  application  of  regulated  tariffs  for  household  consumers  can  explain  why  prices  were  not  as 
sensitive as it would be expected to changes in market conditions 
20See, for instance, EC(2007a) and Thomas (2007)   20
Concentration plays a very important role on the final impact of the competitive 
reform  Both  the  competitive  segments  of  the  electric  power  industry  show  high 
concentration levels (EC, 2009). 
Tables  II  and  III  (see  Appendix)  show  the  concentration  level  of  the  European 
electricity  markets  for  2006  and  2007  respectively  for  the  wholesale  and  the  retail 
markets. 
Out  of  25  countries,  12  presented  a  Herfindhal-Hirschman  Index
21  in  the 
generation  stage  above  5  000  for  the  electricity  generation  segment  (very  high 
concentration), 5 were highly concentrated (HHI between 1 800 and 5 000) and only 8 
of  them  had  a  moderately  concentrated  generation  structure  (HHI  between750  and 
1800). 
Concentration was also remarkable on retailing  (Table 2). Out of the 27 EU 
member states and Norway, 6 had a single company dominating over 5% of the retail 




4.3 The controversial 3
rd Energy Package 
 
  The  3rd  Energy  Package  proposed  in  2007  by  the  European  Commission  – 
coming into force on the 3
rd March 2011 - represented a strong attempt to reinforce the 
unbundling and its effects on competition, and to solve electricity and gas problem of 
network  under-investment.  Under  this  perspective,  it  is  a  crucial  (although 
controversial) tool to make the new electricity model really work. 
  The impact assessment presented by the EC to support ownership unbundling, 
covered  a  wide  range  of  variables.  Most  of  these  impacts  were  analysed  on  past 
empirical evidence.  According to those studies, full ownership unbundling revealed a 
general positive impact on the energy market, in particular by stimulating investment, 
reducing market concentration and contributing to the reduction of energy prices. On 
the other hand, there was no empirical evidence of eventual negative effects on credit 
ratings, share prices, R&D and the relationship with external suppliers (EC, 2007d). 
Due  to  the  EU  dependence  on  fuel  imports,  namely  on  Russian  gas,  ownership 
unbundling presented, according to the Commission, another advantage: it would ensure 
                                                           
21 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is 
calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the 
resulting numbers. 
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that “energy networks could not be owned either by EU suppliers or by non-EU supply 
companies” (EC, 2007d, p.45). 
Although  the  2007  EC  proposal  was  concentrated  on  the  debate  upon  two 
particular institutional arrangements of the electricity transmission – the Independent 
Transmission  System  Operator  (ITSO)  and  the  Legally  Unbundled  Transmission 
System Operator (LTSO) – other 5 models of transmission ownership can be identified 
worldwide: the Independent System Operator (ISO), the Hybrid Independent System 
Operator/Independent  Transmission  Owner  (ISO/ITO)  and  the  traditional  model  of 
Vertical Integration (VI).  
  The National Grid in England and Wales is an example of  ITSO.  It is fully 
unbundled from the rest of the system and the firm owns and operates transmission 
assets. According to Lévêque et al. (2008), this may be the first-best arrangement under 
a national (isolated) perspective framework, where the transmission organization and 
the regulator cover the entire system. These cases have no cross-border externalities and 
cross-border competition in generation is small.  
  An example of LTSO is the French RTE since 2005. The transmission owner 
and the operator are independent but they are 100%-owned by the vertically integrated 
utility. According to Pollitt (2008), this is an increasingly common model. 
  The ISO model exists in several electricity markets, including the USA and in 
Europe. In the USA, it is the case for PJM interconnection,
23 and in Europe for the 
Scottish Electricity. The system operator does not own the transmission assets but it is 
ownership-unbundled from the rest of the system. 
  In  the  ISO/ITO  hybrid  model,  both  of  the  organizations  are  ownership 
unbundled from the rest of the system and the Independent Transmission Owner (ITO) 
has no operation function.  This is the case for Nord Pool, but also for Argentina and
  
Chile. Nord Pool is a particularly interesting case, namely due to the ISOs regional 
coordination and to the significant public ownership of assets.
24 
  Finally, there is still the vertically integrated utility (VI). While the Directives 
have  introduced  regulation  that  removed  this  model  from  the  possible  institutional 
arrangements, it is still de facto in place in some European power markets. 
                                                           
23  PJM  is  a  regional  transmission  organization  that  manages  the  high  voltage  electric  grid  and  the 
wholesale electricity that serves 13 states and the District of Columbia. 
24 See Bergman, (2002, 2003).   22
The Third Energy Package
25 was finally adopted on 13 July 2009 after a long 
struggle  against  different  national  interests  and  perspectives.  In  its  final  version,  it 
allows  for  three  alternative  institutional  arrangements:  ownership  unbundling  (OU), 
independent system operator (ISO) or independent transmission operator (ITO).  
In the ISO model, the member-state appoints an external entity (independent from the 
vertically  integrated  firm)  to  assume  the  Transmission  System  Operator  functions. 
However, the integrated firm is allowed to retain its transmission assets in its balance 
sheet. 
  In  the  ITO  model,  basically  supported  by  France  and  Germany,  the 
Transmission  System  Operator  stays  inside  the  vertically  integrated  firm  and  the 
transmission assets stay in the firm balance sheet. However, the regulation burden is 
reinforced in order to guarantee the ITO independence towards the vertically integrated 
holding. In this model, transmission assets remain in the balance sheet of the vertically 
integrated firm only as financial assets.  
In a report of March 2010 (EC, 2010), the European Commission recognized it 
had applied a high number of procedures (against 25 Member States for electricity and 
against 21 Member States for gas) for serious violations concerning 2003 Directives. 
Those procedures concerned several violations of the current legal framework namely: 
lack of transparency, lack or insufficient coordination among transmission operators to 
allow for the maximum interconnection capacity available, small regional cooperation 
(or even no cooperation at all), insufficient effective intervention by national regulators. 
In fact, most of the problems identified by the Commission in 2005 and 2006 still hold. 
This is confirmed by recent data collected on market concentration (Tables IV and V in 
Appendix)  and  unbundling  of  network  operators,  respectively  Transmission  System 
Operators (Table 5) and Distribution System Operators (Table 6). 
In the last two years, the electricity wholesale market presented a slight decrease 
of  concentration  (in  terms  of  generation  capacity)  which  was  reflected  in  a  lower 
Herfindhal - Hirschman Index for 10 Member States. However, concentration remains 
                                                           
25 This package consist of five new legal acts: Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC; Directive 2009/73/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC; Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators; Regulation (EC) 
No 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 on conditions for access to the 
natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005.   23
high in most regions. This is particularly important as the European Electricity Market 
is, for the moment, mostly the assemblage of regional markets. 
For  the  whole  retail  market,  concentration  remains  very  high  with  few 
exceptions. The market share of the three largest firms is still above 80% in 14 Member 
States (EC, 2010). 
Since 2006/2007, there was no evolution in what concerns TSO unbundling. The 




Table 5 – Electricity TSOs Unbundling 
 
 
     
    Source: EC (2009) 
 
 
A relative stability could be observed for distribution, although some changes in 









                                                           
26 E.ON sold its high-voltage transmission network to the Dutch state-owned TSO (TenneT).   24
Table 6 – Electricity DSOs Unbundling 
 
 
    Source: EC (2009) 
 
4.4   Unbundling and Investment 
 
The need for the improvement of transmission investment is closely related to 
liberalization  and  competition.  Congestion  of  the  transmission  networks  has  greatly 
increased with the development of wholesale markets (Joskow, 2005a, 2005b). This is 
also referred by Hirst (2004) who also argues that investment in transmission capacity 
has not followed the pace of changes in trading patterns. Joskow (2006) explains how 
transmission congestion (and related reliability constraints) creates load pockets, thus 
reducing competition among generators, and how this leads policymakers to impose 
mitigation rules which create other kind of market distortions. 
Part  of  the  lack  of  investment  in  interconnections  can  be  explained  by  conflicts  of 
interest within vertically integrated utilities. Strategic response by agents with market 
power  may  oppose  investment  objectives.  This  was  one  of  the  most  important 
assumptions of the 3
rd Energy Package, namely the EC initial proposal on ownership 
unbundling and also on the powers attributed to the Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER). It will be ACER which will ensure the regulatory oversight 
of cross-border issues. 
In our opinion there were two basic assumptions of the 3
rd Energy Package: (i) 
vertically integrated firms do not want to expand their own networks into markets where   25
they  are  not  currently  competitive  players  or  where  their  expectations  to  become 
competitors are small; (ii) the second assumption is a corollary of the former: a network 
expansion would mean new rivals in their own national market.  
The Commission used some empirical evidence to support the argument that ownership 
unbundling  would  increase  network  investment  and  thus  improve  competition  in 
national markets: 13 Member States had already implemented ownership unbundling in 
electricity  and  7  in  natural  gas.  Having  transmission  as  their  only  business,  those 
companies acted accordingly to their business profile: of companies using auctions to 
ration congested capacity, those which were unbundled reinvested 33% of congestion 
auction  revenue  into  new  capacity  investments.  Instead,  bundled  companies  only 
reinvested 17%. Meanwhile, it was also admitted that there was empirical evidence on 
the decline of network investment along transition periods (to the ownership unbundling 
regime) (Buchan, D. (2007). 
In  the  absence  of  sound  empirical  evidence,  it  is  worth  asking  if  ownership 
unbundling really matters in which concerns network expansion. It seems clear that the 
most important driver of real investments is the expected rate of return. At the same 
time, major risks of network investments are undoubtedly connected to regulation and 
political instability. In Europe, we would say that regulatory risk may be is assumed the 
most serious risk.  
Forecasting  future  investment  needs  (and  costs)  for  electricity  network 
businesses is highly problematic, as asymmetric information between the regulator and 
the  firm  is  the  core  question.  This  has  always  been  one  of  the  most  complicated 
challenges  to  regulation,  as  asymmetric  information  is  also  associated  to  adverse 
selection  problems  (Joskow,  2008).  Regulatory  changes  are  expected  to  be 
implemented, not only on distribution but also on transmission. Incentive regulation and 
incentive regulatory mechanisms are  complex variables to be taken into account by 
network investors.  
Furthermore, the effective capacity of ACER to intervene at cross-border level 
will be crucial to create a stable regulatory framework for cross-border investments, and 
to decrease or minimize the regulatory risk, thus facilitating investments.  These are 
crucial for market integration and to improve competition. 
   26
5. Conclusions 
 
  The  two  sectors  under  analysis  have  quite  different  features  which  naturally 
impose  diverse  regulatory  options.  Electricity  is  a  single  product  industry  while  in 
communications  there  is  a  proliferation  of  services,  with  an  increasing  degree  of 
complementarily. Additionally, the rate of technological innovation is quite different 
among these sectors. In communication sector there is an increasing high rate of new 
services, new networks functionalities and, more recently, the convergence of networks. 
This rapidly changing environment reshapes competition features and demands specific 
regulatory approach. Regarding the unbundling issue, we conclude that the regulatory 
policy in communications is much less mandatory than in electricity or natural gas. 
  The  innovation  rate  for  electricity  has  also  been  much  lower  than  for  the 
communications. This feature certainly contributes for the deeper implementation of the 
unbundling process. Therefore, the regulatory experience in those sectors, namely the 
identification of the problems with functional and legal unbundling, brings important 
lessons  for  the  communications’  regulatory  policy.  In  the  context  of  electricity  the 
following problems still deserve careful attention and monitoring: 
  (i) The evaluation of costs associated to the formation of a new ITSO firm. 
Beyond initial costs, there are also additional costs for (high quality data) information 
systems. Social and cultural costs may also be remarkable in some situations as the 
negotiation with stakeholders may be rather complicated. The costs from the loss of 
scale economies for those firms that were previously integrated will be very high. The 
situation may be even more complicated in the case of the transmission systems of 
small countries.  
  (ii) Between 2000 and  2009, the electricity sector has been an important 
player in the merger business. As refereed by Pollitt (2009) at the beginning of this year, 
vertical integration has increased, either within the electricity sector or by convergent 
mergers (through the acquisition of gas assets). This trend has created a new scenario 
opposite to the EC unbundling measures. 
  (iii)  The  empowerment  of  the  European  Agency  for  the  Cooperation  of 
Energy Regulators (ACER). We are convinced that it is crucial for successful market 
integration and for the security of supply. This is the reason why the final compromise 
that  limited  ACER  to  an  advisory  role  -  to  TSOs,  national  regulatory  boards,  the   27
European Commission, the European Council and the EU Parliament   - will  be, in our 
opinion,  a strategic error.            
                 (iv)  Under-investment  is  linked  to  network  congestion  and  to  adverse 
selection. However, both ITO and ISO alternatives may involve an increased regulatory 
burden  on  companies  and  their  investment  strategies  that  can  compromise  the 
companies expectations. 
  (v) Monitoring the network performance demands constant investments in 
order  to  avoid  costly  interventions.  However,  there  are  problems  in  network 
performance that are difficult to detect. A short-term time-horizon investor may neglect 
this particular characteristic of the electricity industry.  
  The  solutions  to  these  problems  certainly  will  be  important  insights  to  the 
communications  sector.  Until  now,  most  of  the  European  countries  implemented 
accounting separation. Some also implemented functional separation (UK, and more 
recently, Sweden and Italy). This path approximates communications to the electricity 
sector.  However,  with  the  recent  changes  introduced  by  NGN  the  old  questions  of 
vertical separation  emerged once again. Some  claim that, with competing networks, 
vertical separation might no longer be defendable. Others still strengthen the advantages 
of vertical separation, arguing that the alternative technologies had not yet created real 
competition in the market. Overall, we conclude that the analysis of the competition 
level between operators that combine different technologies is a crucial step to discuss 
the regulatory options on unbundling in the communications sector.   28
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Appendix 
 
Table I – Broadband access by technology, July 2008 
lines %  lines %  lines % lines %
Austria 1084541 1,27 590000 3,58 48730 0,94 1723271 1,61
Belgium 1379593 1,61 1132075 6,88 21685 0,42 2533353 2,36
Bulgaria 204858 0,24 101531 0,62 423984 8,18 730373 0,68
Cyprus 122129 0,14 1837 0,01 297 0,01 124263 0,12
Czech Republic 644330 0,75 350000 2,13 632000 12,20 1626330 1,52
Denmark 1246643 1,46 533649 3,24 255176 4,93 2035468 1,90
Estonia 130935 0,15 74532 0,45 111502 2,15 316969 0,30
Finland 1271496 1,49 212933 1,29 47520 0,92 1531949 1,43
France 15867461 18,54 750000 4,56 0 0,00 16617461 15,50
Germany 20226000 23,63 1300000 7,90 92300 1,78 21618300 20,16
Greece 1240148 1,45 0 0,00 5826 0,11 1245974 1,16
Hungary 789613 0,92 657669 4,00 129655 2,50 1576937 1,47
Ireland 611594 0,71 91462 0,56 138534 2,67 841590 0,78
Italy 10338972 12,08 0 0,00 388679 7,50 10727651 10,00
Latvia 170272 0,20 35937 0,22 164563 3,18 370772 0,35
Lithuania 244228 0,29 64626 0,39 237228 4,58 546082 0,51
Luxembourg 113316 0,13 15953 0,10 844 0,02 130113 0,12
Malta 41861 0,05 39868 0,24 2038 0,04 83767 0,08
Netherlands 3541300 4,14 2216000 13,46 94000 1,81 5851300 5,46
Poland 2445698 2,86 1104166 6,71 107850 2,08 3657714 3,41
Portugal 1014235 1,18 635229 3,86 22848 0,44 1672312 1,56
Romania 509791 0,60 508490 3,09 1291962 24,94 2310243 2,15
Slovakia 302270 0,35 55662 0,34 159003 3,07 516935 0,48
Slovenia 263868 0,31 89830 0,55 29823 0,58 383521 0,36
Spain 6922777 8,09 1735146 10,54 135594 2,62 8793517 8,20
Sweden 1755000 2,05 600000 3,65 604500 11,67 2959500 2,76
United Kingdom 13111769 15,32 3563400 21,65 35000 0,68 16710169 15,58
total 85594698 100,00 16459995 100,00 5181141 100,00 107235834 100,00
Countries
Total DSL cable Others
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Table II – Concentration in the wholesale electricity markets in Europe (2006/2007) 
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Table III - Concentration in the retail electricity markets in Europe (2006/2007) 
 
 
    Source: EC(2009) 
 





     Source: EC (2009) 
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Table V - Concentration in the retail electricity markets in Europe (2007/2008) 
 
 
    Source: EC (2009) 
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